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INTRODUCTION

Two former captains of the English national cricket team wanted to
change the rules of the game.' While those rules had been revised and
updated since their inception almost 250 years ago,2 the changes these
cricketers wanted were very different. 3 They were not calling for changing
the size of the bat and ball or the distance of the cricket field called the
"pitch." 4 They wanted changes that went to the so-called Spirit of Cricket.5
This spirit involves respect for one's opponents and for the game's
traditional values. 6 It also involves fair play.7 The plays that are considered
fair and those that are not would become Law 42 of the Laws of Cricket.
Under that law, the distinction could depend on the relative skill of the
players.8 What play was fair against a professional cricketer might be unfair
against the inexperienced, even when dealing with the exact same play. 9
The cricketers who supported these changes would say that the concept
of fair play has always been a part of the game. After all, the idiom "It's
not cricket" "embod[ies] the ideals of fair play, 'gentlemanly' behaviour,
and 'good sportsmanship'."o The idiom further shows how cricket, by the
early twentieth century, "had become a metaphor for honesty, selflessness,

1.

What

is

MCC

Spirit of

Cricket?,

LORD's:

THE

HOME

https://www.lords.org/mec/mcc-spirit-of-cricket/what-is-mcc-spirit-of-cricket/
Nov. 8, 2017) [hereinafter Spirit of Cricket].

OF

CRICKET,

(last

visited

2.
Michael Rundell, Introduction to BODLEIAN LIBRARY, THE ORIGINAL LAWS OF
CRICKET 9, 16 (2008) ("The first evidence of anything approximating a set of rules appears in

1727.").
3.

Spirit of Cricket, supra note 1.

4.
5.

Id.
Id.

6.
MARYLEBONE CRICKET CLUB, THE LAWS OF CRICKET pmbl. (2000 Code 6th ed.
2015) [hereinafter LAWS OF CRICKET].

7.

Id. at pmbl., Law 42.1.

8.
DON OSLEAR, WISDEN'S THE LAWS OF CRICKET 179 (2000) (reproducing Law
42.6(a)(i), which provides that "[t]he relative skill of the striker shall be taken into
consideration" to determine dangerous and unfair bowling).
9.
MARYLEBONE CRICKET CLUB, OPEN LEARNING MANUAL: LAWS OF CRICKET at
Laws 42-3c, -4c (2000 Code 4th ed. 2010), https://www.lords.org/assets/Uploads/olm-4th-

edition-2010-4-10-11-10712.pdf [hereinafter LEARNING MANUAL].
10.

DAVID FRASER, CRICKET AND THE LAW: THE MAN IN WHITE IS ALWAYS RIGHT 1

(2005).
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and upright conduct."" The modem-day players simply needed a reminder
in the form of rule changes. At least that is what the two former captains
thought in the late 1990s.1 2
In the legal field, attorneys are likely to face the equivalent of the
inexperienced cricketer, namely the pro se adversary. The reasons for this
likelihood are varied. They could be constitutional, socioeconomic, or
strategic, for example.1 3 Whatever the reason, they contribute to the rise of
pro se litigation or what some refer to as the "pro se phenomenon."14
Dealing with this phenomenon presents challenges to the courts, while
dealing with pro se litigants presents challenges to the lawyers opposing
them.' 5 But the paramount challenge for the pro se litigant is getting a fair
and just outcome in the legal system.16
To militate against the potential for unfair and unjust results, the
solutions thus far have been focused on strategies to level the playing field.' 7
Those strategies might entail changing the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
or promoting initiatives to increase access to justice." Whatever the
strategy, much of the focus has been on providing varying degrees of legal
assistance to the pro se party.1 9 Little focus has been on the attorney facing
the pro se party.
To be sure, the law of lawyering includes Model Rule 4.3 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Section 103 of the Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers. Both deal with ethics rules when dealing with
a pro se adversary. These rules are nearly identical in providing safeguards
against overreaching and undue influence in such dealings. 20 However, for
two independent and valid reasons, the safeguards are minimal and not very
robust. The first reason is that Model Rule 4.3, for example, does not work

11. JACK WILLIAMS, CRICKET AND ENGLAND: A CULTURAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF
THE INTER-WAR YEARS 74 (1999).
12. Spirit of Cricket, supra note 1.
13. See Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L.103, 104-06 (2002).
14. E.g., id.; Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 374
(2005).
15. See, e.g., Yolanda F. Sonnier, Approaching Your Case Against the Pro Se Litigant,
36 FAM. ADvOC. 11, 11-12 (Fall 2013).
16. See, e.g., LEGAL SERvS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL
LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME AMERICANS 9 (2017), https://www.1sc.gov/sites/default/files/
images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [hereinafter LSC, 2017 REPORT].
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 13, 31, 32.
20. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ETAL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING §§ 42.02, 42.03 (4th
ed. 2017).
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in isolation. Other rules-such as Model Rules 4.1, 4.4(a), and 8.4-provide
additional safeguards in an attorney's dealings with a pro se adversary. The
second reason for the current minimalist approach is that an overly robust
Model Rule 4.3 might antagonize an attorney's ethical duties to the client.
Even so, in some situations, the safeguards are insufficient and
ineffective. As Professor Bruce Green observed, "[1]awyers in civil practice
may exploit their superior skill and expertise in dealing with unrepresented
adversaries, as long as their role is clear and they do not suggest that they are
disinterested." 21 When winning is the focus, an attorney's temptation is to
employ a one-size-fits-all approach. That is, in dealing with a pro se
adversary, the attorney is apt to use the same legal tactics and strategies she
would use against a seasoned litigator. 22 She is apt to use the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, in the
same manner as she would against any adversary, whether pro se or not. The
current law of lawyering does not account for this invariable and unchanging
approach.
It should though. This Article advocates for a professional responsibility
of fair play when dealing with a pro se adversary. Before delineating the
contours of this ethical responsibility, I readily acknowledge the criticism of
looking to the rules of a sport or game for guidance. The heckles and jeers
can be especially loud when it comes to cricket, which has historic
associations with colonialism, elitism, and androcentrism. 23 But even if it
were some other game or sport, prominent jurists recoil at what Dean
Roscoe Pound negatively characterized as the "sporting theory of justice, the
'instinct of giving the game fair play."' 24 To them, the "trial of a lawsuit is
not a game where the spoils of victory go to the clever and technical
regardless of the merits . . . ."25 Scoring runs in a game, the critics would
say, does not have the same import as the life, liberty, or property interests at
stake in the law.
For all these reasons, the criticisms are correct. But they are also
improvident. Looking to the rules of cricket for guidance is justified not
because Dean Pound confused fair play with gamesmanship. 26 Nor is it

21.

Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.

607, 615-16 (1999).
22. See id.
23. See WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 3, 7, 12-13, 93, 114.
24. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 738 (1906) (quoting 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 127 (1904)).
25. Simon v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 180 P.2d 393, 399 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1947).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 174-18 1.
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justified because there are similarities between a sporting contest and
litigation. 27 Indeed, both cricket and American law have British origins. 28
None of that matters, though. What matters, and what this Article argues, is
that the pro se phenomenon is real, and potential solutions should not be
confined to the legal field. As Nobel Laureate and philosopher Albert
Camus 29 once famously noted, sports were from which he learned all that he
knew about ethics.30
With that purpose in mind, this Article explores what the professional
responsibility of fair play entails when dealing with a pro se adversary.
Specifically, Part II of this Article elucidates the existence of the pro se
phenomenon. Part III discusses the impact of this phenomenon on the justice
system at the state and federal levels, as well as the systemic responses to
level the playing field for the pro se litigant. Part IV examines Model Rule
4.3, Restatement Section 103, and the overall approach of the law of
lawyering, especially in light of Oskoui v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. 31
Finally, Part V of this Article unveils the professional responsibility of fair
play, explaining its concept, application, history, and justifications when
dealing with a pro se adversary.
II.

UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PRO SE PHENOMENON

The pro se phenomenon can be distilled down to two explanations. The
first is that a party wants an attorney, but is not entitled to or cannot afford
one. There is, indeed, a limited right of access to counsel. Alternatively, the
party does not want an attorney, even if he or she is entitled to or can afford
one. There is, in other words, a general right to self-representation.

27. See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, FairPlay: Evidence Favorableto an Accused and
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1982).
28. History of Cricket, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historyofcricket#
Origin (last visited Nov. 9, 2017); Law of the UnitedStates, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.o
rg/wiki/Law of the United States (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
29.

Albert Camus, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford

.edu/entries/camus/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
30. ALBERT CAMUS, The Wager of Our Generation, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND
DEATH 237, 242 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1st Vintage Int'l ed. 1995) (1961).
31. Oskoui v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 851 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2017), rev'g,
Oskoui v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV 12-3511 FMO (AGRx), 2015 WL 12656933
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2015).
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Limited Right or Access to Counsel

Many litigants represent themselves in court not because they choose to,
but because they cannot afford an attorney 32 or because they are worried
about costs. 33 Their socioeconomic conditions limit their access to counsel.
Forty to sixty percent of the middle class has its legal needs unmet. 34
Meanwhile, based on a 2009 report, "80 percent of low-income individuals
in the United States cannot afford the legal assistance they need to avoid the
loss of their homes, children, jobs, and liberty." 35 In a report issued eight
years later, nothing much has changed. The Legal Services Corporation, an
entity established by Congress to promote equal access to justice, found that
"[1]ow-income Americans receive inadequate or no professional legal help
for 86% of the civil legal problems they face in a given year." 36
In contrast to access, the right to counsel depends on the type of case.
That right is generally limited to criminal ones and is rooted in the United
States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment affords a right to counsel during
custodial interrogation, 37 while the Sixth Amendment affords that right to a
criminal defendant in federal cases. 38 And the right provided in the Sixth
Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 39
That is true not only for jury trials but also for appeals. 40 However, the right
to counsel is limited to criminal prosecutions actually resulting in
confinement 4' and to the first appeal as of right. 42

32.

Chase T. Rogers, Access to Justice: New Approaches to Ensure Meaningful

Participation,90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1447, 1451 (2015).
33. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME AMERICANS app. C (2009)
[hereinafter LSC, 2009 REPORT].

34.

Jennifer S. Bard & Larry Cunningham, Opinion, The Legal Profession is Failing

Low-Income and Middle-Class People, WASH. POST (June 5, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/opinions/the-legal-profession-is-failing-low-income-and-middle-class-people-lets

-fix-that/2017/06/02/e266200a-246b-11e7-bb9d-8cd6118el409_story.html?utmterm=.8633d
730fd24.
35. Id. (linking to The Unmet Need for Legal Aid, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.ls
c.gov/what-legal-aid/unmet-need-legal-aid (last visited Nov. 9, 2017) (discussing LSC, 2009
REPORT, supra note 33)).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

LSC, 2017 REPORT, supra note 16, at 2, 30.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
Rose v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that the right to counsel for a

discretionary appeal is not required under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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Unlike criminal cases resulting in confinement, the right to counsel is
not always available in civil cases, as illustrated in Turner v. Rogers. 3 In
that case, Michael Turner was a noncustodial party who was obliged to pay
child support. 44 He failed to do so on a number of occasions. 45 Even after

confinement, Mr. Turner remained in arrears. 46 The family court then issued
an order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. 47 When Mr.
Turner finally made an appearance at the civil contempt hearing, an attorney
did not represent him. 48 The family court found Mr. Turner in willful
contempt and sentenced him to twelve months of confinement without
making any finding as to his ability to pay or indicating in the contempt
order form whether he was able to make support payments. 49
In Mr. Turner's civil case, the touchstone for the right of counsel was
not the possibility of confinement. As the Supreme Court held, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not automatically require
the State to provide counsel at a civil contempt proceeding, even if it may
lead to a deprivation of the indigent defendant's liberty. 0 "Civil contempt
differs from criminal contempt."" The former seeks only to 'coerc[e] the
defendant to do' what a court had previously ordered him to do,"5 2 and the
latter is subject to the requirements-including the right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment.53 In short, while he was entitled to alternative
procedural safeguards, Mr. Turner did not have a categorical right to counsel
during his civil contempt hearing.5 4

43. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
44. Id at 436.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 436-37.
49. Id at 437-38.
50. Id at 448.
51. Id. at 441.
52. Id (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911)).
53. Id (citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 693 (1993); Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925)).
54. Id at 448-49. The alternative procedural safeguards include "adequate notice of the
importance of ability to pay, fair opportunity to present, and to dispute, relevant information,
and court findings." Id. at 447-48. They are based on the balancing of the factors announced in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), regarding individual interests, government
interests, and risk of error for due process under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.
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GeneralRight to Self-Representation

The obverse situation is that a party like Mr. Turner wishes to represent
himself. The immediate predecessor to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct recognized, as it must, that a party has a general right
to self-representation. That right has existed for over two centuries. It "has
been protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation."5 6 The current
codified statute 28 U.S.C. § 1654 provides in relevant part: "In all courts
of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally . .. .
Indeed, a criminal defendant has a right to knowingly and
voluntarily opt for pro se representation at trial.58 So even if one has the
right to counsel under either the Fifth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment,
one can waive it "so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent."

59

III. SYSTEMIC IMPACT AND RESPONSES

The general right to self-representation, along with the limited right of
access to counsel, helps explain the existence of the pro se phenomenon.
This phenomenon, in turn, has had a measurable or perceptible impact on the
justice system.60 Cases involving pro se litigants clog the courts on both the
state and federal levels. Yet resources are scarce. 61 As such, pro se cases

55. Ethical Consideration 3-7 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
The prohibition against a non-lawyer practicing law does not prevent a
layman from representing himself, for then he is ordinarily exposing only
himself to possible injury. The purpose of the legal profession is to make
educated legal representation available to the public; but anyone who does not
wish to avail himself of such representation is not required to do so. Even so,
the legal profession should help members of the public to recognize legal
problems and to understand why it may be unwise for them to act for
themselves in matters having legal consequences.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-7 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1980).
56. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812 (1975) (referring to Section 35 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012).
58. Id.at821.
59. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487
U.S. 285, 292 n.4 (1988)).
60. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 32, at 1459.
61. See, e.g., LSC, 2009 REPORT, supra note 33, at 6; see also Lee Rawles, The Fight
for Legal Services, 103 ABA J. 68, 68 (June 2017).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss2/4
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strain the already strained court budgets. 62 However, the toll is not just
economic. Judges and court staff are "frustrated by the pro se litigant's
inability to grasp legal concepts or to comply with the rules of civil
procedure." 63 The emotional toll can be tied to the sheer number of cases in
state courts and federal courts.
A.

SRL Data, Statistics, and Extrapolations
1.

State Courts

The vast majority of cases are filed in state courts rather than federal
courts. 64 Even with an abundance of data, determining the exact number of
pro se civil cases in state courts is difficult.65 The states vary in the way they

define a case with a "self-represented litigant" or SRL. 66 Besides the
variations in definition, some states have case management systems that can
track representation status over time, while others do not. 67 Suppose a party
was self-represented for only part of the case or had the benefit of limited
scope representation. Case management systems would be inconsistent in
tracking this case; some, but not all, would count this situation as a pro se
case. 68
With that caveat in mind, the National Center for State Courts has data
for 2012.69 The number of civil cases and domestic relations cases in state
courts totaled 23.1 million that year. 70 The Self-Represented Litigation
Network estimated that 50% of these cases had only one attorney and that

62. CIVIL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENTS COMM., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO
ACTION: ACHIEVING CIVIL JUSTICE FOR ALL 4 (2016) [hereinafter NCSC, 2016 REPORT].
63. Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness
in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 306 (2002).
64. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE
COURTS 6 (2015) [hereinafter NCSC, 2015 REPORT].
65. Richard Schauffler & Shauna Strickland, The Casefor Counting Cases, 51 CT. REV.
52, 52 (2015).
66. See id.; see also NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, DEVELOPING STANDARDIZED
DEFINITIONS AND COUNTING RULES FOR CASES WITH SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 11

(2013); NCSC, 2015 REPORT, supra note 64, at 8-9.
67. Schauffler & Strickland, supra note 65, at 52.
68. Id.
69. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2012 STATE TRIAL COURT CASELOADS 8 (2014).
70. SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, NATIONAL SRL ESTIMATES FROM
SRLN.ORG (2015) [hereinafter NATIONAL SRL ESTIMATES], https://www.srln.org/system/

files/attachments/National%20SRL%/`20Estimates%/`20-%/`200ct%/p 2 0 2 0 15%/`20srln.pdf.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4
386

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 377

25% had no attorney at all, meaning that at least 75% of all civil cases
included one SRL .71 Based on these estimates and extrapolation, the number
of pro se cases in state courts translated to 11.55 million cases in which an
attorney faced a pro se adversary in 2012.72
Besides the number of cases, the data also can portend the type and
manner of disposition of cases in which an attorney will encounter a pro se
litigant. A 2015 study used case-level data from ten counties regarding all
non-domestic civil cases disposed of between July 1, 2012, and June 30,
2013.73 So while that study did not account for criminal cases and domestic
civil cases, the data indicated that an attorney was very likely to deal with a
pro se adversary in a "contract case," which consisted primarily of debt
collection, landlord/tenant, and foreclosure. 74 That attorney was also very
likely to dispose of the case either by obtaining a default judgment or some
unspecified judgment or by obtaining a dismissal from state court.7 5
2.

FederalCourts

In the federal district court level, there were a total of 291,851 civil
cases during the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2016.76 Of
those, close to 30% were pro se cases. 7 7 That trend is true for the past five
fiscal years, as can be seen in the following table:

71. Id In another study, the data from the National Center for State Courts suggests that
an attorney had up to a 76% chance of dealing with a pro se adversary for non-domestic civil
cases disposed of between July 1, 2012, and June 30, 2013, by state courts in ten different
counties. See NCSC, 2015 REPORT, supra note 64, at 14, 16, 31.
72. NATIONAL SRL ESTIMATES, supra note 70.
73. NCSC, 2015 REPORT, supra note 64, at 16.
74. Id. at 19, 32.
75. Id. at 32.
76. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2016, CIVIL PRO SE AND
NON-PRO SE FILINGS tbl. C-13 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/datatables/
jb cl3_0930.2016.pdf.
77. See id

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss2/4
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Twelve-Month Period
Ending
September 30, 201278

Total Civil
Cases
278,442

Pro Se
Cases
77,703

Percentage as
Pro Se Cases
27.9%

September 30, 201379

284,604

77,311

27.2%

September 30, 20140

295,310

81,025

27.4%

September 30, 2015"

279,036

73,745

26.4%

September 30, 201682

291,851

85,992

29.5%

On average, the federal district courts had about 79,000 pro se civil
cases per year, which translates to almost 28% of the total civil cases.
The pro se phenomenon was not limited to federal district courts.
During the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2016, there were
60,357 in the federal courts of appeals.8 3 Of those, appeals involving pro se
litigants accounted for 52% of the filings for the year ending September 30,
2016.84 And for each year of the three years ending September 30, 2013,
through September 30, 2015, appeals involving pro se litigants held steady at
51%.85

In sum, the number of pro se cases means that an attorney has a high
likelihood of facing a pro se adversary at some point in the attorney's legal
career.

78. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2012, CIVIL PRO SE AND
NON-PRO SE FILINGS tbl. C-13 (2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics
import dir/Cl3Sepl2.pdf.
79. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2013, CIVIL PRO SE AND
NON-PRO SE FILINGS tbl. C-13 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics

import dir/C13Sepl3.pdf.
80. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, CIVIL PRO SE AND
NON-PRO SE FILINGS tbl. C-13 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics

import dir/C13Sepl4.pdf.
81. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015, CIVIL PRO SE AND
NON-PRO SE FILINGS tbl. C-13 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/datatables/

C13Sepl5.pdf.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
83. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, 2016 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 12
(2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2016year-endreport.pdf.

84.

Id.

85. See CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 14 (2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport
.pdf; CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, 2014 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 14
(2014), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2014year-endreport.pdf;
CHIEF
JUSTICE ROBERTS, 2013 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 13 (2013), https://w
ww.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2013year-endreport.pdf.
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CurrentStrategiesfor Leveling the Playing Field

The number of pro se cases also creates what some call the "justice
gap." 86 The concern is that compared to those represented by counsel, pro se
litigants are less likely to experience fair and just outcomes. 87 To bridge this
gap in accuracy of case outcomes, the courts and the legal community have
promoted judicial accommodation and access-to-justice initiatives as
strategies to level the playing field for the pro se litigant.
1.

JudicialAccommodation

Rule 2.2 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides: "A
judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial
office fairly and impartially." In 2007, comment four to this "judicial
impartiality" rule was updated to allow judicial accommodation of the pro se
litigant." Specifically, that comment provides: "It is not a violation of this
Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se
litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard." 8 9
Some states have adopted the exact language of comment four.90 Others
have included a list of permissible actions in the comment. 9' Such actions
that a state judge may make include any or all of the following:
*

Construing pleadings to facilitate consideration of the issues raised;

*

Providing brief information about the proceeding and evidentiary
and foundational requirements;

*

Attempting to make legal concepts understandable;

86. LSC, 2017 REPORT, supra note 16, at 9 ("The justice gap is the difference between
the civil legal needs of low-income Americans and the resources available to meet those
needs."); see also Tonya L. Brito et al., What We Know andNeed to Know About Civil Gideon,
67 S.C. L. REV. 223, 223 (2016).
87. See LSC, 2009 REPORT, supra note 33, at 26; see also Rogers, supra note 32, at
1459.
88. Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and JudicialRole Confusion in "Small
Case" Civil Justice, 2016 BYU L. REV. 899, 931 (2016) (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.2 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2007)).
89. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.2 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR. Ass'N
2007).
90. SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL PROVISIONS ON
SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION 2 (2013) [hereinafter MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
PROVISIONS], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legalaid indigent
defendants/s sclaid atj jud conductcodes.authcheckdam.pdf.
91. Id at 2-6.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss2/4

12

Yee: The Professional Responsibility of Fair Play When Dealing with a
2017]

THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FAIR PLAY

389

*

Asking neutral questions to elicit or clarify information;

*

Modifying the traditional order of taking evidence;

*

Refraining from using legal jargon;

*

Explaining the basis for a ruling; and

*

Making referrals to any resources available to assist the selfrepresented litigant in the preparation of the case. 92

Like many of these other states, New Hampshire has also modified the
model language in its version of comment four. But New Hampshire has
gone a step further. It has also highlighted the self-represented litigant issue
in the text of the rule. 93 Rule 2.2(B) of New Hampshire's Code of Judicial
Conduct provides: "A judge may make reasonable efforts, consistent with
the law and court rules, to facilitate the ability of all litigants, including selfrepresentedlitigants, to be fairly heard." 94
2.

Access-to-Justice Initiatives

The courts and the legal community have made efforts to increase
access to justice. Such efforts include extending to civil cases the right to
counsel guaranteed in criminal cases under Gideon v. Wainwright.95 This socalled Civil Gideon or civil right to counsel is usually not available to all
civil litigants, but only to those who are indigent and who are a party to a
certain category of suits, such as family law matters, involuntary
commitment, and medical treatment. 96 Civil Gideon results from both "state
legislation and
constitutions." 97

court

decisions . . . brought

under

state

and

federal

For other initiatives, some courts even authorize non-attorneys who
meet certain educational and experience requirements to assist pro se
litigants in certain types of cases. 98 Some courts also have self-help resource

92.
93.
94.
95.
providing
96.
97.
98.

Id at 5-6.
Id at 2.
N.H. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.2(B) (2011) (emphasis added).
Brito et al., supra note 86, at 243 app. I (regarding the number of states with laws
for a categorical right to counsel in civil cases based on subject area).
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 228.

ABA COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING
NEW CATEGORIES OF LEGAL SERVICE PROVIDERS 5, 7 (2015); see Deborah L. Rhode, What

We Know and Need to Know About the Delivery of Legal Services by Nonlawyers, 67 S.C. L.
REV. 429, 435 (2016).
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centers with computers and printers to provide standardized legal forms and
instructions in plain English. 99 Other courts, along with legal services
organizations and various nonprofit organizations, go a step further by
establishing programs through which lawyers volunteer to provide shortterm limited legal services. 100 These volunteer attorneys can provide legal
advice to self-represented parties. Or they can "ghostwrite" legal documents,
that is, help self-represented draft documents to submit to the court.'o' All of
these specific, limited tasks constitute "unbundling" of legal services in
which the volunteer attorney does not handle all aspects of a matter.1 02
For the volunteer attorney, the ethics rules are not implicated when she
is providing legal information, as opposed to legal advice.1 03 Even when
they are implicated, the ethics rules facilitate these various access-to-justice
initiatives. Model Rule 1.2(c) authorizes attorneys to provide limited scope
legal representation. It provides that "[a] lawyer may limit the scope of the
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the
client gives informed consent."1 04
Model Rule 6.1 promotes voluntary pro bono public service. It notes
that every attorney has a professional responsibility to provide legal services
to persons with limited means, either directly' 05 or through organizations
that are designed primarily to address the needs of such persons.1 06 Model
Rule 6.1 lists an aspirational goal of providing a minimum of fifty hours of
pro bono service annually. 0 7 Such services can be at no fee or a
substantially reduced fee,'0 8 the latter of which is often referred to as "low
bono."' 09
Model Rule 6.3 generally permits an attorney practicing in a law firm to
serve as a director, officer, or member of a legal services organization, even
if the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the

99. ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., AN ANALYSIS OF
RULES THAT ENABLE LAWYERS TO SERVE SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 2 (2014).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.5 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).

101. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 446 (2007).
102. Id.; see MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, AM. BAR
Ass'N, HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE 5 (2003), http://apps.ameri
canbar.org/litigation/taskforces/modest/report/pdf [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
103. ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 99, at 27.
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6. 1(a)(1) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6. 1(a)(2) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.1(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6. 1(b)(1)-(2) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).

109. See, e.g., Luz E. Herrera, Encouraging the Development of "Low Bono" Law
Practices, 14 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 1, 3-4 (2014).
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attorney. The goal of this model rule is to encourage "[l]awyers ... to
support and participate in legal service organizations."" 0
Finally, Model Rule 6.5 deals with nonprofit and court-annexed limited
legal services programs. It notes that the short-term limited legal services
offered through these programs, regardless of the duration of the
representation, can still establish a client-lawyer relationship." However,
Model Rule 6.5 offers peace of mind to volunteer attorneys whose shortterm limited representation unknowingly presents an actual or imputed
conflict of interest with current or former clients. 112
3.

Shortcomings of the CurrentStrategies

The attorney facing the pro se adversary may or may not welcome the
current strategies to level the playing field.11 3 For the naysayer, no two
attorneys are equal in skill and experience. 114 So the naysayer's argument is
that access-to-justice initiatives like Civil Gideon do not truly alter the
asymmetry of representation in pro se cases." 5 Others argue the opposite
situation that is, symmetry of representation-actually does more harm
than good for most domestic relations cases. 116
Even if one is in favor of the current strategies, one can acknowledge
that they have shortcomings. Some of the current strategies provide for
insufficient access to justice. 117 Court services to help self-represented
litigants are unusable to those who have limited computer competence or
limited English proficiency." 8 And, under the strategy of judicial
accommodation, judges may not be comfortable with what constitutes a
"reasonable accommodation" to a pro se litigant." 9 The Model Code of
Judicial Conduct does not define the term.1 20 Therefore, judges may, as one
option, default to the passive norms of party control and of playing no

110. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
111. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.5 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.5 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
113. See, e.g., Robert Bacharach & Lyn Entzeroth, Judicial Advocacy in Pro Se
Litigation: A Return to Neutrality, 42 IND. L. REV. 19, 44-45 (2009).
114. Drew A. Swank, In Defense ofRules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms
of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1577-82
(2005).
115. Id.
116. See generally Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won't Fix Family Law, 122 YALE
L.J. 2106 (2013).
117. Rhode, supra note 98, at 432.
118. Id. at 430.
119. See Steinberg, supra note 88, at 931.
120. Id.
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independent role in shaping the context or outcome of cases.' 2 ' Spelling out
the actions that a judge may make is certainly helpful in a pro se case. But
thus far, many courts have yet to change their codes of judicial conduct
accordingly. 122
The main shortcoming, though, is that the current strategies will never
completely eliminate the pro se phenomenon. A court's constraints as to
resources, as well as a party's right to self-representation, prevent that from
happening. On the contrary, the pro se phenomenon shows no signs of
abating.1 23 So the focus cannot solely be on programs and ethics rules that
promote legal assistance to the pro se party. The focus also needs to be on
the attorney facing the pro se adversary and the ethics rules that pertain to
such an attorney's professional conduct.
IV. CURRENT ETHICS APPROACHES
ADVERSARY

FOR DEALING

WITH THE PRO

SE

As discussed earlier, the law of lawyering includes rules to promote
access-to-justice initiatives. 124 Those rules ease the ethical burdens on those
willing to represent the indigent. Their ultimate and intended effect is to
provide varying degrees of legal assistance to the pro se party.
However, the law of lawyering is not solely focused on arming an
indigent party with an attorney. It also includes ethics rules to protect a party
that proceeds on a pro se basis. The primary "shield" is Model Rule 4.3 and
its equivalent under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, namely
Section 103. But there are others. Model Rule 4.1, for example, prohibits an
attorney from making false statements of fact or law. Meanwhile, Model
Rule 4.4(a) prohibits an attorney either from using means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person
or from using methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of
such a person. And Model Rule 8.4 prohibits deceptive and misleading
conduct by an attorney.
These protective rules, unlike Model Rule 4.3 and Restatement Section
103, do not specifically address an attorney's dealings with the pro se

121. Id. at 901, 926-37. Professor Steinberg notes that while some judges default to
passive norms, others resort to ad hoc judging in dealings with pro se litigants. Id. at 937, 94043.
122. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT PROVISIONS, supra note 90, at 2-5.
123. See HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 8; see also LSC, 2017 REPORT, supra note 16,
at 14 (finding that 86% of the civil legal problems faced by low-income Americans in a given
year receive inadequate or no legal help).
124. See discussion supra Section III.B.2.
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litigant. They have broader application. Model Rules 4.1 and 4.4(a) address
an attorney's dealings with persons other than the client, of which the pro se
litigant is only a subset. These rules may nonetheless serve as additional
ethical safeguards from the attorney facing the pro se litigant if Model Rule
4.3 and Restatement Section 103 do not apply.1 25
A.

Model Rule 4.3 and Restatement Section 103

The text of Model Rule 4.3 is only three sentences long.1 26 Under the
first sentence, an attorney dealing with a pro se adversary shall not state or
imply that she is disinterested. 127 Under the second sentence, that attorney
has an affirmative duty to correct any misunderstanding of the pro se
adversary as to the attorney's role in the matter.1 28 Under the third and final
sentence, the attorney has a duty to refrain from providing legal advice to the
pro se adversary, other than the advice to secure counsel.1 29 Underlying each
sentence of Model Rule 4.3 is a baseline concept of proper and clarifying
disclosures to the pro se adversary. 130
Restatement Section 103 is substantially identical to Model Rule 4.3,131
except for two significant differences.1 32 First, the duty to not mislead the

125. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 843 (2010). This ethics
opinion addressed the applicability of Rules 4.1, 5.3(b)(1), and 8.4(c). Id. However, it did not
address the applicability of New York's version of Rule 4.3 when an attorney attempts to
"friend" an unrepresented party in a pending litigation. Id. at n. 1.
126. Model Rule 4.3, which is entitled "Dealing with Unrepresented Person," provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall
not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to
secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in
conflict with the interests of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 20, § 42.02.
131. Restatement Section 103, which is entitled "Dealings with an Unrepresented
Nonclient," provides:
In the course of representing a client and dealing with a nonclient who is not
represented by a lawyer:
(1) the lawyer may not mislead the nonclient, to the prejudice of the nonclient,
concerning the identity and interests of the person the lawyer represents; and
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pro se adversary as to the attorney's identity and client's interests in the
case, as well as the duty to clarify any misunderstandings as to the attorney's
role, are triggered only when the pro se adversary suffers prejudice from the
omission of such duties.1 33 Second, Restatement Section 103 does not have
the proscription found in Model Rule 4.3 regarding the provision of legal
advice to the pro se adversary.1 34
Regardless of their differences, Model Rule 4.3 and Restatement Section
103 are similar in that they serve as limitations on partisanship.1 35 According
to Dean Murray Schwartz, the principle of partisanship states: "When acting
as an advocate, a lawyer must, within the established constraints upon
professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that the client will
prevail."1 36 In short, Model Rule 4.3 and Restatement Section 103 are in
direct tension with the attorney's duties owed to the client.
B.

Tension with the Duties Owed to the Client

In general, an attorney facing a pro se adversary has a duty to zealously
represent the client. 137 That duty is limited, as evidenced by the following
comment to Model Rule 1.3: "A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for
every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer
may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the
means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2." 138
However, as noted by Professor David Luban, the current limitations on
zeal are "very slight indeed."1 39 The comment to Model Rule 1.3 expressly

(2) when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
nonclient misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer must make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding when failure to do so would
materially prejudice the nonclient.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
132. HAZARD ET AL., supranote 20, § 42.02.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 150, 150 (David Luban ed., 1984). Dean Schwartz
actually referred to this principle as the "Principle of Professionalism." But because other
views of professionalism are possible, Professor David Luban changed the label-but not the
text-of the principle to Professor Warren Simon's term of partisanship. DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 7 n.6 (1988).
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002) (regarding

diligence). Model Rule 1.3 rephrased the requirement of zeal found in Canon 7 of the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility; LUBAN, supra note 136, at 393 app. 1.
138. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
139. LUBAN, supra note 136, at 394.
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refers to Model Rule 1.2, which deals with the scope of representation and
allocation of authority between a client and the attorney. Model Rule 1.2(a)
provides in relevant part: "[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation and . .. shall consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."' 40 Use of the term
"shall" in the text of Model Rule 1.2(a) means that the rule is an imperative,
thereby defining proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline.' 4 ' In
other words, the attorney facing a pro se litigant must abide by the client's
ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal
representation, subject only to the limitations imposed by law and the
attorney's professional obligations.' 4 2
An attorney also has a duty to consult with the client as to the means by
which the client's objectives are to be pursued.1 43 As acknowledged by a
comment to Model Rule 1.2, an attorney and a client may, on occasion,
disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. 144
However, Model Rule 1.2 "does not prescribe how such disagreements are
to be resolved."1 45 And the preamble to the Model Rules offers only the
following tepid assistance: "A lawyer should use the law's procedures only
for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others."1 46 The
practical reality is that if the disagreement cannot be resolved, the only
choices are for the attorney to resign or for the client to fire the attorney.1 47
Neither choice is appealing to the attorney facing the pro se adversary,
especially in light of the attorney's "own interest in remaining an ethical
person while earning a satisfactory living."1 48
C. Inadequacy of the CurrentApproaches: A Case Study
Oskoui v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank fits the profile of the SRL data on
state courts. 149 It is a "contract case" involving a non-judicial foreclosure. 15

140. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002) (emphasis
added).
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope 14 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
143. Id.
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
145. Id.
146. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 5 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
147. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
148. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 9 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
149. See supra Section III.A. 1.
150. Oskoui v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. CV 12-3511-GW(AGRx), 2012 WL
10209725, at *2-4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2012), rev'd, 851 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2017).
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In the beginning, Ms. Oskoui, a registered nurse,'' had the benefit of
counsel. They filed her complaint in state court, and in April 2012, the
defendants successfully removed her case to the United States District Court
for the Central District of California. A few months later, in July 2012, the
federal district court granted Ms. Oskoui's request to proceed on a pro se
basis.
On August 10, 2012, she filed a First Amended Complaint. While it was
"not a model pleading" and was "somewhat inartfully pled," 5 2 counsel for
the defendants filed, on August 28, 2012, a motion to dismiss the complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).
Instead of seeking a more definite statement under FRCP Rule 12(e),
counsel argued that one claim in the First Amended Complaint was
"nonsensical." 5 3 The federal district court denied defendants' motion to
dismiss as to Ms. Oskoui's claims under the civil Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and under California's Unfair
Competition Law,
California
Business and Professions
Code
Section 17000.1'
The defendants' counsel next conducted discovery and filed a motion
for summary judgment. As evidence of uncontroverted facts in support of
the motion, defendants' counsel proffered their clients' declarations and Ms.
Oskoui's interrogatory responses and deposition transcript. After Ms.
Oskoui filed her objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
counsel for the defendants filed a reply. Counsel argued that Ms. Oskoui
failed to comply with Local Rule 56-2, which required any party opposing a
motion to file a concise Statement of Genuine Disputes.15 5 Counsel also
argued that Ms. Oskoui failed to introduce admissible evidence to defeat the
motion for summary judgment.1 56
On February 26, 2015, almost three years since Ms. Oskoui's case was
removed from state court, the federal district court granted the defendants'

&

151. Oskoui v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 851 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2017).
152. Oskoui, 2012 WL 10209725, at *2.
153. Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. & U.S. Bank, N.A.'s Notice of Motion
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6);
Memorandum of Points & Authorities at 9, Oskoui v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 12-cv03511GW(RZx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2012), ECF No. 19.
154. Oskoui, 2012 WL 10209725, at *5.
155. Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. & U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee's Reply
Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion to for Summary Judgment, or in
the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment at 2-3, Oskoui v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 12cv-0351 1GW(RZx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2014), ECF No. 56.
156. Id. at 4-6.
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motion for summary judgment. 5 7 However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. It
held that Ms. Oskoui had a viable claim under California's Unfair
Competition Law on the ground that she was a victim of an unconscionable
loan modification process.'s It also held that the district court erred by
failing to acknowledge her claim for breach of contract in her First Amended
Complaint. 5 9 Finally, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to permit Ms.
Oskoui to amend her complaint to allege a right to rescind the loan pursuant
to Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790 (2015).160
According to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court in Jesinoski held that the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) "gives a borrower the right to rescind certain
loans, and that this right may be exercised by a written notice from the
borrower to the lender within three years after the consummation of the
transaction."161

The defendants then fired their attorneys and hired new ones. 162
On April 28, 2017, Ms. Oskoui filed her Second Amended Complaint.
This complaint appears to have been ghostwritten by an attorney, at least
when compared to the First Amended Complaint. Consistent with the Ninth
Circuit's opinion, Ms. Oskoui sought relief for rescission of the loan under
the TILA. She also raised fraud, a claim that was not explicitly raised in her
First Amended Complaint.
On May 17, 2017, the defendants' new counsel filed a motion to dismiss
the claims for fraud and rescission of the loan under the TILA. For the fraud
claim, counsel argued that the Ninth Circuit did not grant Ms. Oskoui leave
to assert this new claim. And while the Ninth Circuit granted her leave to
raise the TILA claim, counsel argued that the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act and the statute of limitations under 15
U.S.C. § 1640 barred her claim for rescission under the TILA. After Ms.
Oskoui filed an opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, counsel
filed a reply on June 9, 2017.
In reviewing the history of this case, I am not accusing any of the
defendants' attorneys of impropriety under the current law of lawyering. On
the contrary, I believe many will agree with me that their actions constituted

157. Oskoui v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV 12-3511 FMO (AGRx), 2015 WL
12656933, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2015).
158. Oskoui v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 851 F.3d 851, 856-58 (9th Cir. 2017).
159. Id. at 858-59.
160. Id. at 859.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Request for Approval of Substitution or Withdrawal of Counsel, Oskoui v.
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2:12-cv-03511-FMO-AGR (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2017),
ECF No. 100.
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zealous representation. But having started July 2012, this case is almost half
a decade old and still ongoing. "Procedural complexity is often cited as a
contributing cause of cost and delay," but the problem does not necessarily
fall upon the procedural rules that treat all cases exactly the same regardless
of the complexity of the factual and legal issues underlying the dispute.1 63
Rather, the problem is that attorneys have a great deal of discretion under
these uniform procedural rules to determine the extent to which each case
should be litigated, and the "bar has largely resisted proposals to restrict that
discretion on grounds that any individual case might need an exceptional
amount of time or attention to resolve and therefore all cases should be
managed as if they need that exceptional treatment."1 64
In cases like Ms. Oskoui's, however, what an attorney would normally
do procedurally against an opposing counsel may constitute unnecessary
adversarial excess against a pro se adversary. While Ms. Oskoui surely
contributed to the delay, for example, by seeking to continue the trial and
discovery deadlines,1 65 delay inured to her benefit in this non-judicial
foreclosure case. Accordingly, the defendants' counsel did not help their
cause by filing replies objecting to a pro se adversary's failure to comply
with local court rules. They also did not help their cause by filing motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
especially as to the TILA claim after the Ninth Circuit granted Ms. Oskoui
leave to raise it in her Second Amended Complaint. However, the actions of
the defendants' counsel can be excused because the current culture and
mindset call for an aggressive one-size-fits-all approach.1 66
So if there is to be change, something more is needed. That something
should be sensitive to resource limitations and should comport with and
certainly not conflict with the current strategies to level the playing field.
And that something should assume the continuing existence of the pro se

&

163. NCSC, 2015 REPORT, supra note 64, at 36.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Order Re: Second Joint Ex Parte Application and Protective Order, Oskoui
v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-03511-FMO-AGR (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2013)
(order denying in part and granting in part the Second Stipulation to Continue Trial and
Discovery Deadlines to Accommodate Plaintiffs Medical Needs); Order on Joint Ex Parte
Application for Order Approving Stipulation and to Continue Trial and Discovery Deadlines to
Accommodate Plaintiffs Medical Needs, Oskoui v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 12cv-0351 1-FMO-AGR (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013) (order granting the Stipulation to Continue
Trial and Discovery Deadlines).
166. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND CIVIL JUSTICE
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs., REFORMING OUR CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: A REPORT ON PROGRESS AND PROMISE 3 (2015).
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phenomenon. That something is a professional responsibility of fair play
when dealing with the pro se adversary.
V.

THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FAIR PLAY

Fair play is part of the English lexicon. Webster's Third International
Dictionary defines it as "equitable or impartial treatment: Justice."1 67
Meanwhile, the Oxford English Dictionarydefines the term as "[r]espect for
the fair or equal treatment of all concerned, or for the rules of a game or
sport; just or honest conduct."1 68 And Black's Law Dictionary defines fair
play as "[e]quity, candor, honesty, and fidelity in dealings with another or
others generally." 169
As these different dictionary entries illustrate, a universally agreed-upon
definition of "fair play" does not exist. The reason is that the term is difficult
to define with precision. It is a somewhat abstract concept, which in turn is
defined by reference to other abstract concepts such as justice, honesty, and
equity.17 0 These other abstract concepts, like fair play itself, have an overall
positive moral tone to them.' 7 But the components of fair play even if
everyone can agree as to what those components are-also prove difficult to
define with precision.1 72 They may be multidimensional, depending on
context and various facts and circumstances.1 73
The difficulty in precisely defining fair play is true even in the
philosophy of sport. Although sports philosophers have discussed and
debated fair play in great detail, the concept is still best defined by

167. FairPlay, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1961) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S, Fair

Play].
168. Fair Play, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/fairjplay (last visited Nov. 9, 2017) [hereinafter OXFORD, FairPlay].
169. FairPlay, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

170. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (noting the implicit requirement of due
process in providing "fair play and substantialjustice") (emphasis added); see WEBSTER'S,
Fair Play, supra note 167 ("[E]quitable or impartial treatment"); OXFORD, FairPlay, supra
note 168.
171. See, e.g., RUDOLF KIRCHER, FAIR PLAY: THE GAMES OF MERRIE ENGLAND 17 (R.
N. Bradley trans., 1928) (noting that fair play was the "keynote of the English morality");

Zeljko Kaluderovid, Sport Rules, Sport Moral Values and FairPlay, 2 JAHR 43, 48 (2011)
(characterizing honesty as a moral value); Gerald J. Postema, Integrity: Justice in Workclothes,

82 IOWA L. REv. 821, 845 (1997) (discussing the moral value of fidelity).
172. See, e.g., Scott C. Idelman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L.

REv. 1307, 1316-28 (1995) (attempting to define "judicial candor").
173. See id. at 1324.
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'

contrast.1 74 Fair play is antonymous to gamesmanship and akin to
sportsmanship.1 75 All three-fair play, gamesmanship, and sportsmanshiphave some relationship with the compliance of the constitutive rules, that is,
the written rules that help define the game, such as the number of rounds in a
professional boxing match.1 76 Constitutive rules can be changed, however,
and they have over time.' 7 7 So sportsmanship focuses instead on the
unwritten moral rules based on virtues of righteousness and honesty.' 78 In
contrast, gamesmanship refers to actions that, while not directly violative of
the constitutive rules, are contrary to the spirit in which the sport should be
played. 179 The conception of fair play then fills in the lexical lacuna of
sports philosophy by having two components. 8 0 The formal component
requires a player to comply with the constitutive rules of the game, while the
informal one requires the player to adhere to the ethos or spirit of the
game. 8
The sports concept of fair play has found acceptance in the law,
especially in the area of due process.' 82 Judge Learned Hand "has said that
the requirement of due process is merely the embodiment of the English
sporting idea of fair play." 8 3 Similarly, Professor Barbara Babcock believed
"that the concepts of fair play in sport and due process in criminal trials are
in fact united." 8 4 And the United States Supreme Court has relied on
"traditional notions of fair play," along with substantial justice, to determine

174. See, e.g., Robert Butcher & Angela Schneider, FairPlay as Respect for the Game,
in ETHICS IN SPORT 119, 119 (William J. Morgan ed., 2d ed. 2007); Graham McFee, The
Project of a Moral Laboratory; andParticularism,in THE ETHICS OF SPORTS: A READER 347,
351 (Mike McNamee ed., 2010); ROBERT L. SIMON, FAIR PLAY: SPORTS, VALUES, AND

SOCIETY 38-46 (1991).
175. EMILY RYALL, PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT: KEY QUESTIONS 177 (2016); Kaluderovid,
supra note 171, at 49.
176. RYALL, supra note 175, at 27; Kaluderovid, supra note 171, at 45.
177. RYALL, supra note 175, at 162.
178. Kaluderovid, supra note 171, at 46.
179. RYALL, supra note 175, at 177.
180. Id. (describing the potentially dichotomous goals of abiding by the explicit rules of a
sport versus a commitment to the spirit of the sport).
181. Kaluderovid, supra note 171, at 48.
182. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) ("[D]ue process bars Congress
from enactments that shock the sense of fair play[,] which is the essence of due process.").
183. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 32-33

(1938).
184. Babcock, supra note 27, at 1135.
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the constitutional propriety of a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
under the Due Process Clause."
A.

An Ethical Concept

The sports concept of fair play can also serve as a guidepost for an
ethical concept for dealing with the pro se adversary. A professional
responsibility of fair play, like the sports conception, can have two
components for an attorney to comply with. Both involve the constitutive
rules of the dispute resolution forum. For litigation, they could be the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court's
local rules. For alternative dispute resolution, the constitutive rules could be
the mediator's ground rules.' 86 But whatever the forum, the constitutive
rules also include the rules of professional conduct that the attorney is
subject to and any statute of limitations relevant to the case.
By focusing on constitutive rules, the attorney avoids having to
determine which rules are "procedural," as opposed to substantive, in nature.
This determination can be difficult.'8 7 For example, if a rule is considered
"substantive" because it is outcome-determinative, then a statute of
limitations is not procedural in nature, even though intuitive formalism
suggests otherwise. 1" However, a statute of limitations is outcomedeterminative because, when applicable, a plaintiff's claim is time-barred.' 89
While both components of fair play rely on the relevant constitutive
rules, the difference lies in their focus. For formal fair play, the attorney's
focus is on adherence to those rules. Her conduct with respect to the rules is
ethical and legal; it is neither frivolous nor sanctionable. It is what we expect
from all attorneys, regardless of whether they are facing a pro se adversary.
In contrast, when there is discretion as to the legitimate use of those rules,
informal fair play focuses on the ethos component.
This difference in focus can be illustrated with the statute of limitations.
Such statutes are designed to "promote justice by preventing revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,

185. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990); see also Leslie W.
Abramson, Clarifying "FairPlay and Substantial Justice": How the Courts Apply the
Supreme CourtStandardfor PersonalJurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1991).
186. See, e.g., James Melamed, Sample Mediation Group Rules, MEDIATECOM (Aug.
1998), http://www.mediate.com/articles/melamed7.cfm.
187. Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 205,215 (2004).
188. Id. at 195 n.31, 196.
189. See id. at 196-97.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4
402

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 377

memories have faded and witnesses have disappeared."' 90 Under formal fair
play, an attorney will not file a lawsuit if the statute of limitations applicable
to the client's matter has expired.191 Filing such a lawsuit would be
frivolous, and the attorney could possibly be subject to sanctions under
FRCP Rule 11.192 Now assume an attorney may legitimately raise the statute
of limitations as an affirmative defense. Further assume that doing so will
result in favor of the client. For purposes of informal fair play, the focus is
not on winning, but on the "spirit" of the dispute resolution method.
This ethos is not the same as the spirit of the law or the spirit of the
ethics codes.1 93 The attorney facing a pro se adversary need not worry, at
least for purposes of fair play, about what the intent is behind an ambiguous
statute or ethics rule. The attorney need only be mindful that the ethos
component is about "justice." In litigation, for example, the parties are said
to go to trial to seek "justice," and the judges are said to be the arbiters of
"justice." That is not to say that justice is the only ethos. Lower economic
costs, a lower degree of publicity, and the potential for more amicable
relationships could also be part of the ethos of mediation, for example.1 94
However, "justice" in the broadest sense is the common spirit of all dispute
resolution methods. 195
To that end, an attorney adheres to the ethos component through the
twin considerations of promoting procedural justice and not thwarting
adversarial truth. While procedural justice, like justice itself, has many
conceptions and meanings,

196

underlying all of these theories or definitions

is the lodestar of "fairness." From a psychological perspective, the pro se

190. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (quoting Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348 (1944)).
191. See FED. R. CIV. P. I1 (b)(2) ("The claims . . are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument[.]").
192. FED. R. CIV. P. I1(c).
193. See Samuel J. Levine, The Law and the "Spiritof the Law" in Legal Ethics, 2015 J.
PROF. LAW. 1, 4-7, 14-22 (2015).
194. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES & UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT 3 (2010),
0
.pdf.
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collaborativelaw/uclranduclafinalactjull
195. See John Thibaut & Lauren Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541,
544-45 (1978).
196. For example, the psychological conception of procedural justice is based on
subjective perceptions about fairness of process. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology
of ProceduralJustice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (2011). Meanwhile,
Professor John Rawls has deconstructed procedural justice into perfect, imperfect, and pure
procedural justice. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74-75 (rev. ed. 1999). And under
Professor Lawrence Solum's theory of procedural justice, the important roles of accuracy,
cost, and participation in civil disputes are based on the ordering of two main principles and
various provisos. Solum, supra note 187, at 305-06.
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party's perception of the process being fair is important to that party's
satisfaction with the outcome.1 97 So the ethos component depends on
fairness.
It also depends on truth.' 98 In an idealized version of formal dispute
resolution, each side's attorney will issue discovery, depose witnesses, and
serve subpoenas to get to the "truth" of the matter. 199 The practical reality is
that ascertaining truth, even an "approximate" version of it,200 is difficult
when dealing with a pro se adversary. The unrepresented party with little to
no legal sophistication usually has difficulties presenting her version of the
relevant material facts, much less eliciting those from the other side.20 ' So
under the ethos component of fair play, an attorney must consider using the
constitutive rules in a manner that does not prevent the pro se adversary
from presenting her version of the truth.
To measure "fairness" in procedural justice and to determine whether
the attorney is thwarting adversarial truth, the lens is recognition respect. As
conceived by Professor Stephen Darwall, recognition respect requires an
attorney to first recognize the nature of the adversary and claims at issue and
to then act accordingly. 202 It is not about having the attorney treat the pro se
adversary with esteem that is merited or earned by the latter's conduct or
character. 203 Rather, recognition respect is about having the attorney avoid a
one-size-fits-all approach. It is about how the attorney's relationship and
dealings are to be regulated based on the pro se adversary's level of legal
sophistication, the type of legal interest at stake in the case, and the degree to
which the pro se claims are timely and legally cognizable.
Under recognition respect, no two pro se adversaries are equal. Some
self-represented litigants are seasoned trial lawyers, while some have limited
English proficiency and limited education. Their legal interest at stake may
be grave and significant, such as a life or liberty interest that can result in
confinement or in capital punishment. Or it may be a property interest of
constitutional import or one of much less significance. Whatever the case, an

197. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 196, at 132.
198. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Whose Truth: Objective and Subjective Perspectives
on Truthfulness in Advocacy, 28 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 105, 144 (2016).
199. Id. at 116.
200. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana A. Remus, Advocacy Revalued, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
751,776,771 (2011).
201. Id. at 778-79.
202. Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36, 40 (1977) ("To respect
something in this way is just to regard it as something to be reckoned with (in the appropriate
way) and to act accordingly.").
203. STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 123 (2006).
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attorney facing a pro se adversary can glean much of this information by
reading the pleadings, by conducting Internet research, and by doing what is
normally done in evaluating the other side's claims.
The nature of the pro se adversary and the claim then dictate the manner
and type of procedures to be used. The level of legal sophistication of the
pro se adversary might dictate a motion for a more definite statement rather
than a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, even though both motions are responsive pleadings. As another
example, filing a motion for summary judgment 204 based on deemed
admissions205 is appropriate against a self-represented litigant who is also a
seasoned trial lawyer, but not against a pro se adversary with no legal
training whatsoever.
B.

Application to Pro Se Cases

Moving from ethical concept to application requires an amendment to
Model Rule 4.3 to add a professional responsibility of fair play. This
amendment is based on an attorney's roles as "an officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice,"
and not as a representative of clients.206 As a public citizen, a "lawyer should
be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that
the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate
legal assistance."

207

Even so, inclusion of the word "fair" will be met with resistance,
especially if there are not clear norms. 208 Thus, the comments to Model Rule
4.3 should also be amended. Those comments should begin by emphasizing
that winning the case is not the only consideration in representing a client
and that an attorney also has a consideration of fair play when dealing with a
pro se adversary. The amended comments should further note that fair play
depends on the level of legal sophistication of the self-represented litigant.

204. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
205. See FED. R. CIv. P. 36(a)(3) ("A matter is admitted unless . .

the party to whom the

request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the
matter ....
); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 36(b) ("A matter admitted under this rule is
conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or
amended.").
206. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
207. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 6 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
208. See, e.g., Megan McDermott, Negotiating on Behalf of Low-Income Clients: The
DistortingEffects of Model Rule 4.1, 68 S.C. L. REV. 1, 32 (2016) (recounting the "firestorm
of criticism" provoked by the proposed language requiring "fairness" in negotiations in Model
Rule 4.1).
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Indeed, courts do that already, and the comments can include a citation to
"Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007) (declining to
construe pro se attorney's pleadings liberally)." 209
The attorney would still have to clarify that she is not disinterested, but
the comments could point to the fact that an attorney must exercise
professional judgment at every phase of a dispute, such as the content of a
discovery plan and what motions to file. When the attorney has discretion to
determine the extent to which a case should be litigated, fair play is intended
to promote fairness and justice in the process of dispute resolution, while
still representing the client effectively.
As was suggested in the comments to the codes of judicial conduct, 2 10
advocates of fair play could list steps an attorney may consider in dealing
with self-represented litigants, and which (an attorney might find) are
consistent with this professional responsibility. Those steps could clarify
what does not constitute legal advice to the unrepresented person and what
procedural discretions are permissible. Specifically, the steps could include,
but are not limited to, the following:
(1) providing advice to the self-represented litigant related to promoting
the use of alternative dispute resolution;
(2) providing information to the self-represented litigant regarding any
resources available to assist the litigant in the preparation of the
latter's case;
(3) responding to general questions by the self-represented litigant
about the proceeding and evidentiary and foundational
requirements;
(4) minimizing the use of legal jargon in pleadings, discovery, and
correspondence with the self-represented party;
(5) filing a motion for a more definite statement instead of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;
(6) declining to file a motion for summary judgment or partial
judgment based on deemed admissions of fact; and

209. State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and
Supporting Memorandum, at 16, Sevier v. Thompson, No. 2:16-cv-00659-DN-EJF (D. Utah
Mar. 28, 2017), ECF No. 45 ("While courts generally construe pro se pleadings
liberally, .... the Court does not accord the same leniency to Mr. Sevier because he is an
attorney .... ).
210. See discussion supra Section III.B. 1.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4
406

[VOL. 69: 377

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(7) unless contrary to a court order or unless required by a court's
procedural rules, declining to file a reply to every opposition or
objection that a self-represented litigant files in response to a
motion filed by the attorney on behalf of a client.
Finally, the comments should note that the professional responsibility is
not a vehicle for the pro se litigant or any other party to accuse the attorney
of unfair play. In that regard, making fair play a professional responsibility
is analogous to Model Rule 6.1. Such responsibility would not be
enforceable through the disciplinary process. 211 Yet making fair play a
professional responsibility, like that of providing pro bono services, would
recognize its value in an attorney's dealings with a pro se adversary. 212 And
making fair play a professional responsibility would exhort a return to the
historical notion of fair play as "the individual ethical commitment of each
lawyer." 213

C. History ofFairPlay in the Law ofLawyering
To be sure, the law of lawyering never used the words "fair play." But
the concept has been there historically. The progenitors of Model Rule 4.3
are both the lectures of Judge George Sharswood, published in 1854 as
ProfessionalEthics,214 and the Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional

Deportment (Fifty Resolutions) first included in the second edition of David
Hoffman's A Course of Legal Study in 1836.215 Specifically, Hoffman
Resolution XLIV 216 was the basis for the second sentence of Canon 9 of the

6.1 cmt. 12 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
6.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
6.1 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (Philadelphia, T.

&

211. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.
212. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.
213. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.
214. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON

J.W. Johnson Co. 3d ed. 1869).
215. MODEL

RULES

OF

PROF'L

CONDUCT

preface

(AM.

BAR

Ass'N

2002),

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/publications/model rules of
professional_conduct/model_rulesofjprofessionalconductpreface.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2017); James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.'s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2395, 2422 (2003).
216. Hoffman Resolution XLIV provides:
Should the party just mentioned have no counsel, and my client's interest
demand that I should still commune with him, it shall be done in writing only,
and no verbal response will be received. And if such person be unable to
commune in writing, I will either delay the matter until he employs counsel,
or take down in writing his reply in the presence of others; so that if occasion
should make it essential to avail myself of his answer, it may be done through
the testimony of others, and not by mine. Even such cases should be regarded
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ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics,2 17 which later served as the basis for
Model Rule 4.3.218

Hoffman, without using the term itself, would recognize the concept of
fair play.219 His Fifty Resolutions emphasized the importance of the "due
application of the law"220 and "justice," 22 1 two concepts that correspond to
the constitutive rules component and ethos component, respectively, of the
ethical concept of fair play. Within the ethos component, Hoffman's Fifty
Resolutions recognized recognition respect to a certain degree. It
differentiated the ethical demands of "civil cases" from situations "[w]hen
employed to defend those charged with crimes . . . ."222 His Fifty Resolutions
recognized the pro se status of an adversary and that "such [a] person
[might] be unable to commune in writing." 223 They expected an attorney to
"duly examin[e] a case," 224 including whether the "client's ...
defense . . . [could] be sustained," 225 thereby requiring the recognition of

whether the adversary's claim was legally cognizable. 226 If the client's case
could not be sustained, then Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions advocated for his
version of procedural justice. The attorney was to neither "glean[] some
advantage by an extorted compromise" nor resort to "a dishonorable use of
legal means in order to gain a portion of that, the whole of which ... would
be denied to [the client] both by law and justice." 227 Finally, Hoffman's Fifty
Resolutions had a strong regard for "truth," thereby evidencing the implicit

as the result of unavoidable necessity, and are to be resorted to only to guard
against great risk, the artifices of fraud, or with the hope of obviating
litigation.
2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE
PROFESSION GENERALLY 771 (Baltimore, Joseph Neal, 2d ed. 1836).
217. The second sentence of Canon 9, which is entitled "Negotiations with Opposite
Party," provides: "It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that
may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise
him as to the law." AM. BAR Ass'N COMM. ON CODE OF PROF'L ETHICS, FINAL REPORT 578
(1908), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011 build/professional resp
onsibility/1908_canons_ethics.authcheckdam.pdf.
218. Altman, supra note 215, at 2425 n.184.
219. See HOFFMAN, supra note 216, at 754-57 (regarding Hoffman Resolutions XI and
XV).
220. Id. at 755-57 (regarding Hoffman Resolution XV).
221. Id. at 754-57 (regarding Hoffman Resolutions XI and XV).
222. Id. (regarding Hoffman Resolutions XI, XIV, and XV).
223. Id. at 755-57 (regarding Hoffman Resolutions XIV and XV).
224. Id. at 771 (regarding Hoffman Resolution XLIV).
225. See id. at 754 (regarding Hoffman Resolution XI).
226. Id.
227. Id. (emphasis added).
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importance of adversarial truth over pure partisanship on behalf of the
client.228
Sharswood, in formulating his own Professional Ethics, surely was
familiar with Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions.2 29 Sharswood echoed Hoffman's
limits as to partisanship, 230 in particular, as to the means and manner of how
an attorney should represent the client. 23 1The attorney was to avoid "special
pleading," "sharp practice," and "insisting upon the slips of the opposite
party" if the attorney believed the opposite party's claim was honest and
just.232 Sharswood wrote:

[Counsel] may fall back upon the instructions of his client, and
refuse to yield any legal vantage-ground, which may have been
gained through the ignorance or inadvertence of his opponent.
Counsel, however, may and even ought to refuse to act under
instructions from a client to defeat what he believes to be an honest
and just claim, by insisting upon the slips of the opposite party, by
sharp practice, or special pleading-in short, by any other means
than a fair trial on the merits in open court. There is no professional
duty, no virtual engagement with the client, which compels an
advocate to resort to such measures, to secure success in any cause,
just or unjust; and when so instructed, if he believes it to be
intended to gain an unrighteous object, he ought to throw up the
cause, and retire from all connection with it, rather than thus be a
participator in other men's sins. 233

So for Hoffman and Sharswood, winning the client's case was not
everything. How the attorney won, and to what purpose the attorney
prevailed, also counted. To them, fair play mattered.
Undeniably, the times have changed since Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions
and Sharswood's ProfessionalEthics. As the critics will correctly point out,
just because the concept of fair play was present in the nineteenth century's
version of legal ethics does not mean that it should continue in the current

228. Id. at 755-57, 766-67, 769-71 (regarding Hoffman Resolutions XV, XXXV, XLI,
and XLII).
229. Altman, supra note 215, at 2425 n.185.
230. SHARSWOOD, supra note 214, at 42-43.
231. Altman, supra note 215, at 2401.
232. SHARSWOOD, supra note 214, at 42.
233. Id. at 100-01.
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law of lawyering.23 4 Indeed, the regulatory environment has changed from
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. 235 The theoretical underpinnings of legal ethics have
moved from moral philosophy to a client-centered jurisprudence of
lawyering. 23 6 So why should there be an express duty of fair play when
dealing with the pro se adversary?
D. Justificationsfor an Express ProfessionalResponsibility
When both parties are represented, the current rules need not have an
express professional responsibility of fair play. If one attorney is being
unfair in discovery, the other side's attorney will file a motion for protective
order or a motion to compel. If one attorney is being unfair in questioning a
witness, the other side's attorney will raise an evidentiary objection. And if
one attorney is making unfair allegations in the pleadings, the other side's
attorney will file a motion for sanctions. None of these protections from
"unfair play" is evident when there is an asymmetry of representation.
As the Seventh Circuit observed, "[p]rosecutors must remember to live
up to the code of professional ethics and fair play at all times or the
American system of justice cannot endure, and ultimately our nation will
lose confidence and trust in its rendering of justice . . . ."237 The same
reasoning justifies an express professional responsibility of fair play when
dealing with a pro se adversary. Socio-psychologists have uniformly found
that a party's perception of the process being fair was important to that
party's satisfaction with the outcome. 238 An express professional
responsibility of fair play thus furthers the public's confidence in the justice
system. 239

234. Ted Schneyer, How Things Have Changed: Contrasting the Regulatory
Environments of the Canonsand the Model Rules, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 161, 187 (2008).
235. Id.
236. Katherine R. Kruse, The JurisprudentialTurn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 493
(2011).
237. United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 433 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
238. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 953 (1990);
E. Allan Lind et al., Procedureand Outcome Effects on Reactions to AdjudicatedResolution of
Conflicts of Interest, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 643 (1980); Tom R. Tyler,

Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural
Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 850 (1994); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the FairnessofLegal Procedures, 22 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 103 (1988); Tom R. Tyler, The Role ofPerceivedInjustice in Defendants' Evaluations of
Their Courtroom Experience, 18 L. & Soc'Y REV. 51 (1984).
239. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 6 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
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An express professional responsibility of fair play will also help change
the culture and mindset that have more recently defined the process for civil
cases. 240 It will hopefully shape that culture and mindset by promoting the
avoidance of adversarial excesses. It will serve as a reminder that
attorneys-all of whom have taken an oath to support the United States
Constitution 241 have an obligation to "establish Justice" on behalf of "We
242
the People of the United States."

And to the represented parties, an express professional responsibility
imposed on their counsel will let them know that fair play matters. That their
attorneys are not here, as Professor Green put it, to simply "exploit their
superior skill and expertise in dealing with unrepresented adversaries, as
long as their role is clear and they do not suggest that they are
disinterested." 243 Because if all attorneys have a professional responsibility
of fair play against a pro se adversary, then the represented party motivated
solely by victory will soon itself become the pro se litigant seeking justice.
VI. CONCLUSION

At the outset of this Article, I noted that two professional cricketers
were worried that other players had essentially forgotten the true meaning
behind the idiom: "It's not cricket." 244 So they sought to enshrine both the
"Spirit of Cricket" and "fair play" into the game's laws. Their "initiative
proved successful."

245

What is now considered fair play is dependent, in

part, on the relative skill of the players.246 And "cricketers, right across the
world, are increasingly aware that they should not merely obey the game's
247
Laws but safeguard its Spirit."

The challenge, and the focus of this Article, was whether these cricket
concepts could be adapted for use in the legal field. The straightforward part
was seeing that a new strategy needs to be employed. The pro se
phenomenon has shown no signs of abatement, even with the current
strategies to level the playing field. Many of them focus on elevating and
supporting the pro se party's side. Those strategies, while laudable,

240. Rogers, supra note 32, at 1451.
241. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 portion
of 2017-2018 Legis. Sess.).
242. U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
243. Green, supra note 21, at 6 15-16.
244. See discussion supra Part I.
245. Spirit of Cricket, supra note 1.
246. LAWS OF CRICKET, supra note 6, Law 42.6(a)(i).
247. Spirit of Cricket, supra note 1.
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ultimately prove to be incomplete because of a party's general right to selfrepresentation and the practical reality of limited resources.
What more is needed is a change in culture and mindset of the attorney
facing the pro se adversary. Those changes can be accomplished through an
express professional responsibility of fair play. The ethical concept is
comprised of formal and informal components to comply with the
constitutive rules of the dispute resolution forum and the ethos of the dispute
resolution method. Of the ethos component, the attorney facing the pro se
adversary should promote procedural justice and not thwart adversarial truth,
both through the lens of recognition respect. Moving from an ethical concept
to application requires amending Model Rule 4.3 and its comments. While
no strategy is foolproof, the hope is that an express professional
responsibility of fair play will serve as a simple reminder-and perhaps even
inspire a new idiom as to how an attorney should deal with a pro se
adversary.
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